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ABSTRACT
Research consistently shows that truthful accounts are richer in
detail than deceptive accounts. It is unknown, however, how
interviewees strategically regulate the information they provide
when their accounts contain both truthful and deceptive
information. This study examined how truths and lies interact, and
whether interviewees’ self-reported strategies reﬂect such
interactions. Participants (n = 144) provided one statement
consisting of two elements. We manipulated the veracity of these
elements, with participants allocated to either both truthful, both
deceptive, or one truthful and the other deceptive conditions.
Results indicated that interviewees calibrate the richness of detail
provided in the ﬁrst element of their statement based on the
veracity of the following element. Moreover, our exploratory tests
revealed that lies become more detailed when they are ﬂanked
by truthful information relative to when they are ﬂanked by other
deceptive information. The ﬁnding that truthful and deceptive
information interacts to inﬂuence detail richness provides insight
into liars’ strategic manipulation of information when statements
contain a mixture of truths and lies. Strategic manipulations of
this kind could potentially threaten the reliability of commonly
used verbal lie detection tools. This study also oﬀers insight to
legal practitioners who rely on baseline deviations to assess
credibility.
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In the legal arena, ascertaining the credibility of an interviewee remains an integral com-
ponent of the investigative process. However, credibility assessment is a challenging task.
Decades of research indicate that humans are poor lie detectors, rarely achieving accuracy
rates above chance level (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). One of the explanations for the poor lie
detection performance is an overreliance on behavioural cues. No single behaviour, nor
group of behaviours, is systematically and reliably indicative of deception (DePaulo et al.,
2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Wright & Wheatcroft, 2017), yet people continue to base
their judgements on non-diagnostic behavioural cues such as gaze aversion or ﬁdgeting
(Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004).
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Research regarding verbal deception detection is more promising. A stable ﬁnding
within the literature is that liars’ statements contain signiﬁcantly fewer details than
truth-tellers’ statements (Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij,
2008a). More speciﬁcally, liars’ statements contain less perceptual, spatial, and temporal
details than truth-tellers’ statements (Vrij, 2008a, 2008b). Much of these ﬁndings stem
from research on Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) and
Reality Monitoring (RM; Alonso-Quecuty, 1992, 1995; Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998;
Johnson & Raye, 1981). Both CBCA and RM assume that recollections of personally experi-
enced events are more detailed and coherent than statements about unexperienced or
fabricated events (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Undeutsch, 1967, 1989; Vrij, 2005, 2008a)
because memories of external origin (i.e. truthful reports) are based on perceptual pro-
cesses whereas memories of internal origin (i.e. deceptive reports) are based on individ-
uals’ imagination and reasoning. In particular, it can be reasoned that truths represent
experienced memories and are more likely to include perceptual, contextual and
aﬀective information and to be more clear and plausible than lies, which are based on
imagination (Johnson & Raye, 1981).
Statements often consist of a mixture of both truths and lies. When given the opportu-
nity, liars will incorporate their deception into descriptions of previous experiences, so
called embedded lies. Evidence for the prevalence of embedded lies comes from Leins,
Fisher, and Ross (2013). In two studies, these authors found that the majority of liars –
67% in the ﬁrst study and 86% in the second – chose to formulate their deceptive
account based on a previously experienced event. Additionally, Nahari, Vrij, and Fisher
(2014) found that of their 44 mock criminals who were instructed to provide deceptive
statements, more than half indicated that over 20% of their statement was truthful. The
use of embedded lies has been observed across various populations, whether it is research
participants (Bell & DePaulo, 1996; Leins, Zimmerman, & Polander, 2017), non-criminals
engaging in deception (DePaulo et al., 2003), or criminal suspects (Hartwig, Granhag, &
Strömwall, 2007).
The embedding of lies into otherwise truthful statements is also reﬂected in the ﬁndings
from research examining the strategies interviewees adopt to appear credible (Clemens,
Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013; Fiske & Taylor, 2008). For example, Hartwig and col-
leagues’ (2007) examination of guilty and innocent suspects’ strategies revealed that one
of liars’most endorsed strategies was to avoid lying by telling the truth asmuch as possible.
Interviewees’ strategic attempts to be perceived as credible can be explained by the theory
of self-regulation, a framework for understanding howpeople aremotivated to control their
behaviour to move away from undesired outcomes and to reach desired goals (Carver &
Scheier, 2012; Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). Liars strategically attempt to edit reality
to create a plausible, logical story (Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003; Vrij, Granhag, &
Mann, 2010) that may have its foundations in truthful previous experiences. In contrast,
innocent interviewees are generally forthcoming and aim to provide full, candid accounts
(Hartwig et al., 2007) using their memory to reconstruct what happened.
In the present study, we investigated to what extent truthful and deceptive information
interacts to inﬂuence detail richness. The rationale for expecting truths and lies to interact
is based on research into beliefs about cues to deception. Several studies have shown that
people believe inconsistencies are a sign of deception (Blair, Reimer, & Levine, 2018; Vre-
develdt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). Consequently, it is not surprising that liars report
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to try to maintain consistency as a strategy to appear credible. In general, liars tend to be
most concerned with reducing the amount of inconsistencies within the details of their
statement compared to any other type of inconsistency (e.g. between-statement or state-
ment-evidence inconsistencies; Deeb et al., 2017, 2018). As a result of their eﬀorts to main-
tain consistency, liars tend to be equally or more consistent than truth-tellers (Granhag &
Strömwall, 2002; Granhag et al., 2003; Vredeveldt et al., 2014), who – as a normal function
of memory – may appear inconsistent as information is naturally added or forgotten (e.g.
Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009).
In one of the only studies to include statements that purposefully contained both truths
and lies, Deeb et al. (2017) instructed liars to provide a statement containing reports of a
deceptive event and a truthful event during two interviews. When asked about their strat-
egies for appearing credible, nearly half of the liars (45%) reported an attempt to maintain
consistency across the interviews for both events. Moreover, many liars reported that they
did so by strategically lowering their ‘baseline consistency’ by including fewer repetitions
in non-critical portions of the interview. In contrast, only 8% of truth-tellers reported using
the consistency strategy (Deeb et al., 2017). Given liars’ focus on consistency, it is plausible
that when their statements contain both truthful and deceptive information their eﬀorts to
maintain consistency may extend to the richness of information provided.
In sum, lies are rarely complete fabrications. Yet, this is often how they are treated in
research (Vrij, 2008a), leaving a signiﬁcant gap within the deception literature. Examination
of statements consisting of both truths and lies could account for individual diﬀerences in
deceiving (see Vrij, 2016) and provide insight into liars’ verbal behaviour. As such, the
objective of the current experiment was twofold. First, we extended the ﬁndings of
Deeb et al. (2017) to examine how truths and lies interact to inﬂuence the consistency
of detail richness across elements of a statement. Second, we examined to what extent
such interactions are reﬂected in deceivers’ self-reported strategies. To examine this, the
participants in our study provided a statement consisting of two elements. We manipu-
lated the veracity of these elements, with participants either delivering both truthful,
both deceptive, or one truthful and the other deceptive element. Based on the general
verbal deception literature, we predicted that truthful elements would be richer in
detail than deceptive elements (Hypothesis 1). There are two ways in which participants
could maintain consistency. First, by calibrating the content of the second element of
their statement to that of the ﬁrst element. This would imply that elements preceded by
a lie would be less detailed than elements preceded by a truth (Hypothesis 2). Second, it
is also possible that participants would anticipate the second element, and calibrate the
content of the ﬁrst element to that of the second. Our next prediction was therefore
that elements followed by a lie would be less detailed than those followed by a truth
(Hypothesis 3). Finally, we expected that the interaction between lies and truths would
be, at least in part, reﬂected in the participants’ self-reported strategies (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 144 native-German speaking undergraduate students (116
females; 28 males) who participated in exchange for either course credit or a €7.50
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voucher. A priori power analysis suggested that to achieve an 85% likelihood of detecting
a true diﬀerence given a medium eﬀect size ( f = .25; Cohen, 1988), 146 participants were
required. To allow for an equal distribution across conditions we opted for 144 partici-
pants. All participants were between 18 and 26 years old (M = 20.81, SD = 1.70), and had
not yet received any information on lie-detection or interviewing techniques in their cur-
riculum. The study was approved by the standing ethical committee.
Design
The present study used a 2 (Veracity of the ﬁrst element [truth, lie]) by 2 (Veracity of the
second element [truth, lie]) between-subjects factorial design. Our primary dependent
measure was the richness of detail (i.e. quantity of perceptual, spatial, and temporal infor-
mation combined) in each of the elements separately.
Procedure
Upon arriving to the lab and providing informed consent, participants completed a demo-
graphic questionnaire measuring their age, sex, race, native language and education.
Afterwards, they received a sealed envelope that contained a letter instructing them to
complete no task, one task, or two tasks. The envelope was labelled only by participant
number to ensure the researcher was blind to conditions during the interview. Task A con-
sisted of helping to develop a promotional ﬂyer for a café located at the University
campus. Participants were instructed to walk across campus to the café and to use the
camera provided to take photos that could be included on a ﬂyer to promote the café.
In Task B, participants were requested to walk across campus to the bus stop located at
the University Medical Centre. Upon arrival, they had to look for a woman named Michelle,
of whom they were provided with a photo and informed she would be arriving by bus at
some time that day. They were asked to wait for a minimum of ﬁve minutes, and to use the
notepad and pen provided to write down the information of any buses that arrived or
departed during their time. Participants were told to take a photo of Michelle using the
camera provided, if they saw her arrive. In reality, Michelle was a ﬁctitious character and
participants did not encounter her during the task. Participants were given up to thirty-
ﬁve minutes to complete their task/s. Both tasks were designed to ensure comparable dur-
ation and diﬃculty, as well as similarities regarding participants’ familiarity with the routes
and locations.
Participants were randomly assigned to complete no task, one task, or two tasks. For the
participants who completed two tasks, the order was counter-balanced. Upon returning to
the laboratory after completing their assigned task/s, participants received a second
sealed envelope explaining they would be interviewed by the researcher about Tasks A
and B and that they were to report and answer questions as if they had completed
both tasks. As a result, we created four (between-subject) veracity conditions: Lie-Lie (par-
ticipants who completed neither of the tasks), Lie-Truth and Truth-Lie (participants who
completed either Task A or Task B), and Truth-Truth (participants who completed both
tasks). The instruction letter contained a brief description of what Tasks A and B entailed
to allow those who did not complete one or both of the tasks to familiarize themselves
with what they would be reporting (see Supporting Information). This also allowed liars
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to know, in advance of providing their statement, during which element/s of their state-
ment they were required to lie. Participants were told it was important to be convincing
because (i) it would prevent them from having to stay an additional twenty minutes to
provide a written account and (ii) it would earn them a chance to win a €50 raﬄe. After
receiving these instructions, participants were given ten minutes alone to prepare.
Next, participants underwent a structured, information-gathering style interview (see
Supporting Information). The interviews were audio recorded. At the outset of the inter-
view, the researcher stated that her goal was to obtain as much information as possible,
and to determine the participant’s credibility. The researcher also reminded participants
that she was blind to the veracity condition, and instructed them to report as many
details as possible, even if they did not think they were important. Each interview
began with the elicitation of a free narrative of the participants’ activities during the
ﬁrst task. The researcher then asked a series of questions such as ‘What else can you tell
me about this task?’, ‘How long did this task take you?’, ‘Did anything unexpected
happen?’ The same procedure was repeated for the second task. Afterwards, the
researcher gave participants an opportunity to provide any missing information regarding
either task.
Following the interview, participants completed the Post-Interview Questionnaire. They
were asked to rate several items on 5-point Likert scales (1 – strongly agree to 5 – strongly
disagree): (i) I felt motivated to convince the interviewer that I completed both tasks, (ii) I
had enough time to prepare for the interview, (iii) I prepared my statements strategically1,
(iv) I was successful in convincing the interviewer that I completed both tasks, (v) I think I
will have to stay longer to provide a written statement. Participants then responded to two
open-ended questions regarding their strategies for convincing the interviewer of their
credibility and their strategic preparation. As well, participants responded to two mul-
tiple-response questions that asked them to select the verbal strategies (e.g. forthcoming-
ness, avoidance, telling a plausible or clear statement, providing unveriﬁable details; see
Table 2) and nonverbal strategies (e.g. maintaining eye contact, not ﬁdgeting, appearing
calm) they used when reporting each of the tasks separately. After completing the ques-
tionnaire, participants were debriefed and the experiment was concluded. None of the
participants were asked to stay longer to provide a written statement and all participants
were included in the raﬄe. The experiment lasted approximately one hour.
Coding
Verbal content analysis. The audio recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. The
ﬁrst author trained two coders, both of whom were blind to the veracity of the statements.
These coders assessed the statements for detail richness, represented by the sum of three
types of detail; speciﬁcally, (1) perceptual details: Information about what the interviewee
saw (e.g. ‘She wore a red blouse’), heard (e.g. ‘He talked loudly’), smelled (e.g. ‘It smelled
like fresh cookies’), tasted (e.g. ‘It was bitter), or felt (e.g. ‘The sunshine was warm’)
during their activities; (2) spatial information: Information about locations (e.g. ‘On the ele-
vator’) or the spatial arrangement of people and/or objects (e.g. ‘The cups were on the
bar’); and (3) temporal information: Information about when the activities or event hap-
pened (e.g. ‘It was 10:00am’), duration of an activity (e.g. ‘It took me six minutes to walk
there’), or an explicit description of a sequence of events (e.g. ‘After getting my coﬀee, I
left’). For each participant, the coders marked all perceptual, spatial, and temporal
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details individually in the text, and tallied the frequency of occurrence of each of these
details for the element of the statement dealing with Task A and Task B individually.
This coding scheme is publically available on the Open Science Framework.
The main coder and the second coder coded a randomly selected 20% of the state-
ments in order to establish reliability. Inter-rater reliability between the two coders for
each of the criteria in the total statements, using the two-way random eﬀects model
measuring consistency (e.g. Koo & Li, 2016; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018), was high
for perceptual information (Single Measures, Intraclass correlation coeﬃcient, ICC
= .91), spatial information (ICC = .89), and temporal information (ICC = .75). After conﬁ-
rming the reliability between the two coders, the second coder rated an additional
17 statements, and the main coder completed the remaining sample of participants’
statements.
For our analyses, we calculated a total richness of detail score by summing the number
of perceptual, spatial, and temporal details for the elements of the statement relating to
Task A and Task B separately.
Finally, we also coded for the clarity of statements (i.e. relating to RM; Johnson & Raye,
1981; Vrij, 2008a). This criterion was scored as present (1) if the statement was clear, sharp
and vivid and scored as absent (0) if the statement was vague and dim. As well, we coded
for the plausibility of statements and for the presence of unexpected complications. The
latter two variables are not reported in the manuscript because we observed ﬂoor eﬀects
for each variable and therefore cannot report reliable data.
Strategies. To code the participants’ self-reported strategies, one main coder examined
the open-ended responses to establish data-driven categories (see Masip & Herrero,
2013). This entailed a multi-stage process that began by identifying each participant’s
strategy or strategies, then grouping together overlapping responses, and gradually con-
densing these responses into key categories based on conceptual similarities. The ﬁrst
author oversaw each stage of this process and decided upon the ﬁnal categories. A
total of eight categories emerged from this coding method (see Table 1).
The main coder and a second coder then coded a randomly selected 20% of the par-
ticipants’ open-ended responses in order to establish inter-rater reliability regarding the
classiﬁcation of responses into the appropriate categories. After conﬁrming that the
raters were consistent (Single Measures ICCs ranging from .55 to 1.00)2, the main coder
completed the remaining sample of participant responses and only these scores were
used in the analysis.
In addition to coding participants’ interview strategies, we also examined their self-
reported methods of interview preparation. The same qualitative coding method as
above was used for preparation coding. Inter-rater reliability was excellent (Single
Measures ICCs ranging from .95 to 1.00). The main coder’s scores for the entire sample
were used in the analyses.
Analysis
To test whether the participants calibrated the richness of details of the elements accord-
ing to the veracity of the preceding or following element, we conducted two 2 × 2
ANOVAs. First, we tested the eﬀect of the ﬁrst element on the second by submitting
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the richness of details in the second element to a 2 (veracity of the second element: [truth,
lie]) × 2 (veracity of the ﬁrst element: [truth, lie]) between-subjects ANOVA. Second, we
tested the eﬀect of the second element on the ﬁrst element by submitting the richness
of details in the ﬁrst element to a 2 (veracity of the ﬁrst element: [truth, lie]) × 2 (veracity
of the second element: [truth, lie]) between-subjects ANOVA. Additionally, the data were
examined by calculating a Bayesian ANOVA with default prior scales (i.e. r scale ﬁxed
eﬀects at 0.5), using JASP. We report the Bayesian factors (BF; e.g. Lee & Wagenmakers,
2013) in line with the guidelines by Jarosz and Wiley (2014), adjusted from Jeﬀreys
(1961). The approximate evidence categories are as follows: Positive values between 1
and 3 indicate weak evidence for the alternate or null hypothesis, values between 3 and
10 indicate substantial evidence, values between 10 and 20 constitutes strong or very
strong evidence, and values above 20 are considered very strong or decisive evidence. Evi-
dence for the interaction termwas calculated by dividing the interactionmodel by themain
factors (e.g.Wagenmakers et al., 2016). For ease of interpretation, BF10 is used to indicate the
Bayes factor as evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis, whereas BF01 is used to indi-
cate the Bayes factor as evidence in favour of the null hypothesis.
Results
Motivation, preparation, & self-perceived success
Participants reported to have been highly motivated and to have had enough time to
prepare for the interview, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between veracity groups. Signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences emerged between conditions in terms of strategic preparation and self-
perceived success. Participants reported more strategic preparation for deceptive
elements of the statements than for truthful elements. Additionally, participants who
ﬁrst reported deceptive elements were more likely than any other group to believe that
Table 1. Frequency and percentage of overall interview strategies across veracity conditions.
Condition
Interview Strategy Truth-Truth Lie-Lie Truth-Lie Lie-Truth
Provide a detailed, plausible account 21
(40.38)
22
(30.99)
27
(38.03)
25
(38.46)
Strategic control of behaviour 5
(9.62)
18
(25.35)
12
(16.90)
9
(13.85)
Manipulate verbal content:
General linguistic control
1
(1.92)
9
(12.68)
8
(11.27)
7
(10.77)
Manipulate verbal content:
Include truthful details
5
(9.62)
11
(15.49)
2
(2.82)
5
(7.69)
Use imagination to deliver the statement 2
(3.85)
5
(7.04)
5
(7.04)
9
(13.85)
Manipulate verbal content:
Maintain consistency between elements
0
(0)
0
(0)
11
(15.49)
8
(12.31)
No strategy 7
(13.46)
6
(8.45)
4
(5.63)
1
(1.54)
Provide a truthful account 11
(21.15)
0
(0)
2
(2.82)
1
(1.54)
Total frequency count per condition 52 71 71 65
Note: The numbers reported represent the frequency occurrence of each strategy. The respective percentage within each
condition is presented in brackets. Frequencies may add up to over 36 (the number of participants in each condition)
because each participant could report multiple strategies that may have fallen into one or more categories. The
bolded numbers represent the categories with the two largest percentages per veracity condition.
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they would have to stay longer to provide a written statement. To conserve manuscript
length, the exact analyses are reported in the Supporting Information.
Interview preparation techniques
Across veracity conditions, four preparation techniques emerged from our qualitative
coding of participants’ responses. Participants in the Lie-Lie condition reported the
highest overall frequency of preparation techniques whereas those in the Truth-Truth con-
dition reported the lowest. The respective endorsement of the four techniques was similar
across veracity conditions, with the most frequently endorsed technique being to ‘Use
imagination to prepare the statement’, followed by ‘Strategically preparing the statement
and/or responses’, ‘Purposefully manipulating the content of the statement’, and ‘Other or
miscellaneous’. The exact analyses are reported in the Supporting Information.
Statement clarity
Veracity signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the perceived clarity of both the ﬁrst and second element
of interviewees’ statements only when they were reporting entirely truthfully or entirely
deceptively, with truthful statements being evaluated as more clear than deceptive state-
ments. The complete analyses are presented in the Supporting Information.
Richness of detail
Conﬁrmatory analyses
To test whether elements preceded by a lie would be less detailed than elements pre-
ceded by a truth (Hypothesis 2) we conducted a 2 (veracity of the second element:
[truth, lie]) × 2 (veracity of the ﬁrst element: [truth, lie]) between-subjects ANOVA on the
richness of details in the second element. This analysis revealed a main eﬀect of veracity
of the second element, F(1, 140) = 10.98, p = .001, h2
P
= .073; BF10 = 22.00, with truthful
elements (M = 34.76, SD = 18.26, 95% CI [31.00, 38.53]) scoring higher on richness of
details than deceptive elements (M = 25.85, SD = 14.11, 95% CI [22.09, 29.61]). The main
eﬀect of the veracity of the ﬁrst element was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 140) = 3.01, p = .085,
h2
P
= .021; BF01 = 1.57, meaning that the elements preceded by a lie (M = 27.97, SD =
17.07, 95% CI [24.21, 31.73]) were not signiﬁcantly less rich in detail than elements pre-
ceded by a truth (M = 32.64, SD = 16.45, 95% CI [28.88, 36.40]). Finally, the interaction
eﬀect was also not signiﬁcant, F(1, 140) = 2.00, p = .160, h2
P
= .014; BF01 = 1.74, indicating
the veracity of the ﬁrst element had no diﬀerential eﬀect on the richness of detail score
of the second element. Taken together, we received support for Hypothesis 1, that truthful
elements are richer in detail than deceptive elements; however, we did not show support
for our second hypothesis, that interviewees would calibrate the content of the second
element to that of the ﬁrst (Figure 1).
To investigate whether participants calibrated the ﬁrst element according to the second
element (Hypothesis 3) we conducted a 2 × 2 (veracity of the ﬁrst element: [truth, lie] ×
veracity of the second element: [truth, lie]) between-subjects ANOVA on the richness of
details in the ﬁrst element. The main eﬀect of veracity of the ﬁrst element was signiﬁcant,
F(1, 140) = 9.45, p = .003, h2
P
= .063; BF10 = 10.79, with truthful elements (M = 35.71, SD =
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14.42, 95% CI [32.75, 38.67]) being richer in detail than deceptive elements (M = 29.19, SD
= 11.27, 95% CI [26.23, 32.16]). The main eﬀect of veracity of the second element was also
signiﬁcant, F(1, 140) = 5.60, p = .019, h2
P
= .038; BF10 = 1.95, with the elements followed by a
lie (M = 29.94, SD = 13.48, 95% CI [26.98, 32.91]) scoring lower on richness of details than
the elements followed by a truth (M = 34.96, SD = 12.73, 95% CI [32.00, 37.92]). Lastly, the
interaction eﬀect was not statistically signiﬁcant, F(1, 140) = 1.50, p = .222, h2
P
= .011; BF01 =
2.12, indicating the veracity of the second element had no diﬀerential eﬀect on the rich-
ness of detail score of the ﬁrst element. Overall, we found additional support for Hypoth-
esis 1, that truthful elements are richer in detail than deceptive elements, and we
supported our third hypothesis, that interviewees would calibrate the content of the
ﬁrst element to that of the second (Figure 2).
Exploratory analyses
As we were speciﬁcally interested in how lies are inﬂuenced by truthful information, we
also carried out two exploratory independent-samples t-tests comparing the richness of
details of lies only. We corrected for inﬂated type 1 error probability by applying a Bonfer-
roni correction dividing the alpha of .05 by two, resulting in a signiﬁcance level of .025. We
found a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in mean richness of detail score of the deceptive
second element between those preceded by a truth versus by a lie, t(70) =−2.66, p = .010;
BF10 = 4.64, with those preceded by a lie (M = 21.61, SD = 10.45, 95% CI [14.80, 28.42])
being signiﬁcantly less rich in detail than those preceded by a truth (M = 30.08, SD =
16.05, 95% CI [23.27, 36.89]). There was also a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in mean
richness of detail score between deceptive ﬁrst elements followed by a truth versus by
a lie, t(66.34) =−3.03, p = .004; BF10 = 10.81, indicating that a lie followed by another lie
Figure 1. Mean richness of details in element two as a function of veracity condition. Standard errors
are represented by the error bars attached to each symbol.
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(M = 25.39, SD = 9.34, 95% CI [21.20, 29.58]) was signiﬁcantly less detailed than a lie fol-
lowed by a truth (M = 33.00, SD = 11.86, 95% CI [28.81, 37.19]).
Interviewees’ strategies
The vast majority of interviewees reported using strategies to enhance the likelihood that
they would be perceived as credible: 95.49% of participants reported using one or more
verbal strategies (e.g. telling a plausible story, keeping the statement clear and simple,
reporting from previous memory; see Table 2) and 92.02% indicated using at least one
nonverbal strategy (e.g. maintaining eye contact, not ﬁdgeting, appearing conﬁdent, etce-
tera) during their interview. In this section, we will concentrate our reports primarily on the
verbal strategies relating to our consistency hypotheses.
Overall interview strategies
Table 1 provides an overview of the data derived from the coding of participants’ open-
ended responses regarding their overall interview strategies. Across all veracity conditions,
the most frequently mentioned verbal interview strategy was to ‘Provide a detailed and
plausible account’ (36.68% of all reported strategies). Only 7.34% of the reports fell into
the category of ‘Manipulating the verbal content by maintaining consistency between the
statement elements’ (e.g. matching the type and quantity of details provided in both
elements, adapting the deceptive story to the truthful story or vice versa, etcetera). As
shown in Table 1, only participants in the Truth-Lie and Lie-Truth conditions reported strat-
egies relating to maintaining consistency between their statements, with no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in mean scores for endorsing the consistency strategy between these two con-
ditions, t(70) = 0.70, p = .486; BF01 = 3.33. Thus, participants in the mixed veracity
Figure 2. Mean richness of details in element one as a function of veracity condition. Standard errors
are represented by the error bars attached to each symbol.
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conditions reported similarly (albeit infrequent) strategic attempts to match the consist-
ency of their reports, whereas participants who fully lied or fully told the truth, did not
report to utilize such a strategy.
Interview strategies for individual statement elements
We were also interested in interviewees’ strategies, relative to each element of the state-
ment individually. We asked participants to indicate which strategies they used for their
reports of each Task A and Task B separately from a predetermined response set of mul-
tiple verbal strategies (see Table 2). Regarding the strategies for the second element of
their statements, one of the most frequently endorsed strategies by participants in the
Truth-Lie condition was ‘Matching the amount of details in statements’ (13.82% of the
endorsed strategies among this condition). Similarly, the same matching strategy was
the most frequently endorsed strategy by participants in the Lie-Truth condition
(17.89% of the endorsed strategies among this condition). This provides partial support
for our prediction that interviewees in the mixed veracity conditions would report
having strategically calibrated their verbal content based on the veracity of the preceding
element. Taken together, these ﬁndings contribute partial support to Hypothesis 4, which
predicted that the interaction between lies and truths would be, at least in part, reﬂected
in participants’ self-reported strategies.
Discussion
In line with previous research (e.g. Amado et al., 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008a), we
found support for our hypothesis that truthful elements are richer in detail than deceptive
Table 2. Frequency of verbal strategy endorsement for element one and two across conditions.
Condition
Interview strategy Truth-Truth Lie – Lie Truth-Lie Lie-Truth Total
Strategies for Element One
Forthcomingness 30 8 29 11 78
Telling a plausible story 13 24 12 23 72
Providing details the investigator cannot check 10 21 15 25 71
Keeping the statement clear and simple 17 21 11 15 64
Reporting from previous experience/ memory 6 22 7 19 54
Outright fabrication 1 11 2 18 32
Avoidance 3 12 5 10 30
Other 2 0 0 1 3
None 1 0 0 0 1
Total frequency counts 83 119 81 122 405
Strategies for Element Two
Telling a plausible story 8 26 29 12 75
Providing details the investigator cannot check 10 21 21 15 67
Keeping the statement clear and simple 13 22 13 18 66
Forthcomingness 28 7 9 21 65
Matching the amount of details in statements 9 13 21 22 65
Matching the type of details in statements 8 12 19 16 55
Reporting from previous experience/ memory 8 12 19 8 47
Outright fabrications 5 9 13 1 28
Avoidance 2 14 8 7 31
Other 1 1 0 1 3
None 2 1 0 2 5
Total frequency counts 94 138 152 123 507
Note: The numbers reported represent the frequency of participants who endorsed each strategy.
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elements (Hypothesis 1). We also found evidence that truthful and deceptive information
interacts to inﬂuence detail richness: (i) Elements followed by a lie were less detailed than
elements followed by a truth (Hypothesis 3), and (ii) deceptive elements became more
detailed when ﬂanked by a truth than when ﬂanked by a lie.
Participants only calibrated the detail richness of the ﬁrst element based on the vera-
city of the second element. An explanation for this could be that participants knew, prior
to the interview, whether they would be deceptive or honest about each element of the
statement. When participants anticipated having to tell a lie in the second element of
their statement, they may have already focused their eﬀorts on this from the beginning
of their interview (Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann, & Hillman, 2013). The directed attention of
their cognitive resources towards ensuring the latter element of the statement was per-
ceived as credible may have impaired the detail richness of the former element of the
statement. This directed attention could even provide an alternative explanation for
the diﬀerences in detail richness between lies and truths. Given that these lies are
most likely to actually consist of a mixture of truths and lies, it may not be memory pro-
cesses, but directed attention that can account for the typical ﬁnding that lies are less
detailed than truths.
We did not ﬁnd support for our prediction that elements preceded by a lie would be
less detailed than elements preceded by a truth (Hypothesis 2). Yet, our exploratory
tests of lies only did reveal that participants calibrated their lies according to both the pre-
ceding and the following element, with deceptive elements becoming more detailed
when ﬂanked by a truth than when ﬂanked by a lie. The discrepancy between these
two ﬁndings may mean we had insuﬃcient power to detect the main eﬀect and/or inter-
action in the omnibus test. This is supported by the Bayes factors of 1.57 and 1.74, supply-
ing only weak evidence for the absence of such eﬀects. However, the results of the
exploratory tests suggest that liars were intentionally calibrating the detail richness of
their lies to that of the truths, perhaps to avoid noticeable inconsistencies between the
truthful and deceptive elements of the statement. Future studies could examine
whether this eﬀect replicates, and if so, how lies become richer in detail.
From a motivational perspective, participants in the mixed veracity conditions had the
same task: Providing a statement with one truthful element and one deceptive element.
As a strategy, they could either (i) boost the richness of details within the deceptive
element making it resemble the truthful part, or (ii) reduce the detail richness within
the truthful element to make it resemble the deceptive element. Our exploratory
ﬁndings – that participants in the Truth-Lie and Lie-Truth conditions provided more
details than participants in the Lie-Lie condition – suggest that interviewees applied the
ﬁrst strategy, increasing the detail richness of the deceptive element to match that of
the truthful element. More broadly, the order of presenting the truths and lies within state-
ments, and not solely the veracity, could have inﬂuenced the richness of details provided
by participants in the mixed veracity conditions. Speciﬁcally, interviewees may have pre-
ferred to begin by telling the truth and to integrate their lie midway through the state-
ment, a pattern previously observed in a study examining deception within an
insurance claim setting (Leal, Vrij, Nahari, & Mann, 2016). The tendency for insurance clai-
mants to begin by reporting truthfully and to tell their lies as the interview progressed may
have been an attempt to gain the investigator’s trust or to become more comfortable with
the interview setting and investigator. There may also have been a cognitive reason:
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Beginning with a lie increases cognitive demand meaning that interviewees have to for-
mulate and intentionally activate a plausible lie while suppressing the truth (e.g. Vrij,
2015), during an unfamiliar situation. Future research should continue teasing apart the
motivational and cognitive processes of liars who report both truthful and deceptive infor-
mation within one statement.
We found only limited support for our prediction that the diﬀerences in the richness of
details in statements would be reﬂected in participants’ strategies (Hypothesis 4). Partici-
pants in the mixed veracity conditions reported similar, albeit infrequent, attempts to
match the consistency of their statements, and participants who fully lied or fully told
the truth, did not utilize such a strategy. The relatively low number of participants report-
ing to have used a consistency strategy corresponds to the modest eﬀect sizes found in
our quantitative analyses. As argued by Ericsson and Simon (1980), when asking partici-
pants to make retrospective judgements regarding their behaviour, inconsistencies can
arise because of the experimental procedures, particularly when using questions that
are too general to prompt the information actually sought. Since we asked broad strategy
questions, this could have led to less accurate responses.
Our research was not without limitations. First, we examined the eﬀect of two elements
immediately following each other. This is appropriate to establish whether an eﬀect
appears, but future research could utilize a less artiﬁcial paradigm that better translates
to applied contexts; for example, examining statements with lies and truths dispersed
throughout. Similarly, our results may not generalize to situations in which the liar is
unable to anticipate the exact topic or direction of the interview, such as when unexpected
questions are asked. Perhaps in such situations, participants’ strategic attempts tomaintain
consistency would not calibrate predominantly in the direction of the following element.
Third, we cannot conclude that participants, who were instructed to lie, provided lies that
were entirely untruthful. In fact, in the current study, participants across veracity conditions
reported tohave strategically included truthful details they haddrawn fromprevious experi-
ences and/or memory. Hence, we are left with deceptive statements that may be, realisti-
cally, a combination of truths and lies, which may have weakened the strength of the
observed eﬀects. Indeed, participants in themixed veracity conditions may have easily bor-
rowed truthful details from their experience of the completed task for their descriptions of
the fabricated task, whereas complete liars may not have experienced any event rich in
detail during the allotted time. This strengthens the argument that liars in themixed veracity
conditions drawon recent truthful previousmemories to calibrate their statementswhereas
liars whoprovide entirely deceptive accountsmay not. Fourth, the focus of this studywas on
one particular aspect of statement consistency: Consistency in detail richness. It is also poss-
ible that the elements of participants’ statements were consistent, or inconsistent, on other
dimensions than detail richness, such as linguistic characteristics.
Another consideration is that the emotional pressure experienced by liars during actual
investigative interviews is conceivably much higher than during psychological exper-
iments. Additionally, nearly 80 percent of our sample was female, a disproportion that
may also impact the generalizability of our ﬁndings since the majority of perpetrators
that come to the attention of the criminal justice system are male (e.g. Heimer & Lauritsen,
2008; U.S. Department of Justice, 2009). However, it is unlikely that stakes or gender
robustly inﬂuenced our results since the same theoretical assumptions and strategies
should apply across low and high stakes contexts and for males and females.
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We observed ﬂoor eﬀects for the variables regarding unexpected complications and
plausibility. One potential explanation is that the presence of complications may be situ-
ation-related. The low rate of reported complications in our sample could be because the
reports were about short encounters scripted by the researcher, as opposed to longer
activities initiated by the participant (e.g. Vrij et al., 2018). Additionally, the statements
may have been judged as implausible since they were about unique experimental tasks
as opposed to more believable day-to-day activities.
The research presented in this manuscript has two practical implications. First, our
results show that liars are able to calibrate the detail richness of their lies to that of
their truths. This presents a possible threat to the diagnostic accuracy and utility of
verbal credibility assessment tools if liars are able to provide lies that mirror the richness
of detail in the truthful components of their statement (e.g. Gnisci, Caso, & Vrij, 2010; Leins
et al., 2017; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012).
A second practical implication relates to the baseline technique. Baselining refers to
the practice in which interviewers evaluate the veracity of a critical component of a state-
ment relative to a baseline, or neutral, component of the same statement (see Vrij, 2016
for an overview). Baselining is frequently used by police in practice (Ewens, Vrij, Jang, &
Jo, 2014; Frank, Yarbrough, & Ekman, 2006; Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013). This
approach encourages starting an interview with a neutral – and often truthful – part.
Our ﬁndings indicate that interviewees calibrate the detail richness of the initial com-
ponent of their statement based on the veracity of the following component. Therefore,
if suspects manipulate the richness of details provided in their initial baseline statement
to be consistent with the detail richness provided in their subsequent reports, then
potential truth-lie diﬀerences may disappear. A possible preventative measure is for lie
detectors to control for the event and to ask about the same event multiple times in
diﬀerent formats (e.g. ﬁrst obtaining an oral account and then a sketch), using the ﬁrst
statement as a baseline (Vrij, 2016).
In sum, the current study addressed if and how truthful and deceptive information
interacts to inﬂuence the richness of details in statements, and how this is reﬂected in indi-
viduals’ strategies. The results indicate that interviewees calibrate the richness of detail
provided in the ﬁrst element of their statement based on the veracity of the following
element, however, this eﬀect was not robustly reﬂected in interviewees’ self-reported
strategies. Moreover, it seems that participants calibrate their lies according to both the
preceding and the following element, with lies becoming more detailed when ﬂanked
by truthful information.
Notes
1. One participant’s response to this question was not recorded via Qualtrics and therefore the
results to this speciﬁc question are based on N = 143.
2. The average ICC across the eight strategies categories was .80. Two categories, relating to
general linguistic control and behavioural control, had low to moderate inter-rater reliability.
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